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NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY CONVENTIONS: STATE'S
INTEREST SUBORDINATE TO PARTY'S IN
DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESS
Petitioner-defendants, the Cousins delegates, challenged the seat-
ing of the Wigoda delegates, respondent-plaintiffs, at the 1972 Demo-
cratic National Convention. 1 In asserting a right to replace the Wigoda
group, the Cousins challengers alleged that the Wigoda delegates had
been chosen in violation of certain party guidelines on delegate selec-
tion.2 A series of court battles ensued, 3 from which the Wigoda dele-
in Colvin v. State, Dep't of Transp., 311 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1975), the following statement was
made in explaining why the court had granted certiorari to review a compensation order:
Where the IRC is placed on the level an "appellate court" in the review of JIC actions,
as it has been by our holding in Scholastic Systems, it follows as with DCA appeals that
the actions of the "trial court" (JIC) arrive in the appellate court (IRC) with a presump-
tion of correctness. JIC findings and awards or denial thereof can be overthrown only if
not well founded under applicable legal principles, which would include a misapplica-
tion of applicable law, or upon a showing of a lack of competent evidence to support the
findings or the ruling of the trial judge. IRC affirmance when there is such a lack of
evidence, or reversal where the evidence is in fact sufficient, would constitute a "depar-
ture from the essential requirements of law" which would vest jurisdiction for certiorari
in the Supreme Court.
Id. at 368. Thus, in terms of the types of questions which the supreme court will review under
the Scholastic Systems doctrine, there appears to be no change from the appellate-type review
which resulted from the Wilson case. What is different, however, is the manner in which the
supreme court is exercising its discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny certiorari. A
perusal of the Southern Reporter advance sheets since the Scholastic Systems decision clearly
indicates that the supreme court's normal procedure has been to deny, rather than grant,
certiorari.
1. The 59 members of the Wigoda group, which included Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago,
had been elected at the March 21, 1972, Illinois Democratic primary to represent the Chicago
area as uncommitted delegates to the convention.
These delegates, who were chosen in the exclusive manner for electing delegates from Illinois
on April 19 were certified by the Illinois Secretary of State to represent the Chicago area at the
national convention, pursuant to ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 46, §§ 7-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1972) (prior
to its amendments which have little bearing on this discussion).
The Cousins group, originally 10 in number, on March 31 filed their formal challenge with
the National Democratic Party. Later, in Chicago on June 22 and June 24, 1972, the Cousins
delegates were chosen at private caucuses, conducted according to the Party rules formulated by
the McGovern Commission. See note 2 infra. Headed by Alderman William S. Singer and the
Reverend Jesse Jackson, this group of delegates consisted of the original 10 challengers and 49
other individuals, including some candidates who had been defeated for election as delegates in
the March 21 primary.
2. These Democratic Party guidelines were established as a result of discontent among some
party members at their 1968 convention over the inability of the convention system to represent
the will of the people in selecting presidential candidates. The 1968 convention committed itself
to reforming the convention system by formulating procedures assuring greater public participa-
tion in selecting national convention delegates for the 1972 convention. Therefore, the
McGovern-Fraser Commission was established to suggest changes in the process of choosing
delegates. The guidelines, formulated by the Commission and subsequently adopted by the
Democratic Party and incorporated into article II, part I of the Call to their 1972 Convention
included assurances of adequate minority group, women, and youth participation and open
slate-making procedures. All the guidelines are reprinted in full in 117 CONG. REC. 32908 (1971)
(remarks of Senator McGovern concerning the COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELA-
GATE SELECTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE [McGOVERN COMMIS-
SION], MANDATE FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
(1970)).
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gates obtained an injunction from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois to enjoin the Cousins delegates from participating as delegates
to the convention. Following the convention's vote to seat them,
however, the Cousins delegates ignored the injunction, and, as a result
of their fully participating in the convention, criminal contempt pro-
ceedings were initiated against them. 4 The Cousins group challenged
the constitutionality of the circuit court injunction, but the Illinois
Appellate Court upheld the injunction on the ground that the state's
interest prevailed over the party's interest in delegate selection proce-
dures.5 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held, reversed:
The circuit court injunction which was based on the Illinois Election
Code6 and which prevented the challenging delegates' participation in
the Democratic National Convention, abridged political associational
rights of both the Cousins challengers and the Democratic Party. In
the selection of delegates to national political conventions a state's
interest is subordinate to the pervasive national interest served by the
party convention. Cousins v. Wigoda, 95 S. Ct. 541 (1975).2
Historically, political parties have enjoyed a position relatively
independent of judicial intervention regarding their internal affairs.
Rather than impose the views of one faction of the party upon another,
courts have recognized the desirability of allowing parties to resolve
their own internal conflicts. Courts, however, have occasionally in-
truded into party affairs in two types of conflict:8 (1) conflicts between
the state's power to regulate the electoral process and the party's
Traditionally, the call to the convention (where the national parties invite the states to send
a certain number of delegates meeting certain criteria, such as loyalty to the party) has contained
few qualifications for delegates; therefore, seldom were challenges asserted. Segal, Delegate
Selection Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 873 (1970).
However, with the unprecedented promulgation of rules by both major parties in recent years,
the number of challenges has dramatically increased.
3. The extensive litigation concerning the seating of the Chicago delegates is outlined in
Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 461-68, 302 N.E.2d 614, 618-22 (1973), and Cousins v.
Wigoda, 95 S. Ct. 541, 543-47 (1975).
4. A lawyer for the Wigoda group petitioned the circuit court to hold the Cousins group in
contempt of the court order. For an account of this contempt proceeding see N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 1972, at 25, col. 1. The contempt proceedings were pending in the circuit court and awaiting
the outcome of this Supreme Court decision.
5. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973). The Illinois Appelate
Court based its affirmance of the July 8 injunction on the grounds that the Illinois law provided
the exclusive manner to select delegates. "[T]he law of the state is supreme and party rules to the
contrary are of no effect." 14 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 302 N.E.2d at 627. The Supreme Court of
Illinois, without opinion, denied leave to appeal this judgment. Wigoda v. Cousins, Ill. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 29, 1973.
6. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 46, §§ 7-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1972) (prior to its amendments which
have little bearing on this discussion).
7. The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Blackmun, White, and Marshall.
Justices Rehnquist, Stewart and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Powell
concurred in part and dissented in part.
8. Note, Presidential Nominating Conventions: Party Rules, State Law, and the Constitu-
tion, 62 Geo. L.J. 1621 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 62 Geo. L.J.]; Note, Judicial Intervention in
the Presidential Candidate Selection Process: One Step Backwards, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1184
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 47 N.Y.U.L. REv.].
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regulation of delegate selection, and (2) conflicts between the rights of
individual voters, as protected by the fourteenth amendment, and the
rights of the party. 9
The first of these conflicts-which is the crux of the Cousins
case-arises from the power granted to the states by article II, section
110 of the Constitution to prescribe the manner of appointing presiden-
tial electors. Courts have interpreted this state power broadly," and
through this power states have enacted statutes to establish the right of
the electorate to vote in the general elections for President and to
prescribe the method of selecting delegates to political party conven-
tions. '
2
9. The Supreme Court in Cousins did not deal extensively with this second conflict. How-
ever, other court decisions have considered the problem. Judicial intervention into party affairs
on the basis of conflict between individual and party started with the Texas White Primary cases,
as discussed in 47 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at 1186-87 and in Comment, The Application of
Constitutional Provisions to Political Parties, 40 TENN. L. REv. 217, 219-26 (1973).
With the emergence in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1972), of a new justiciability
concept to enable judicial rulings on the electoral process, the Supreme Court may have provided
a future basis for judicial intervention into party affairs through equal protection standards.
Several commentators have urged the courts to apply equal protection standards in the appor-
tionment of delegates to political party conventions. 62 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1643 n. 111.
Lower federal courts were divided concerning the expansion of judicial intervention into
party matters, as discussed in 47 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 8, at 1191-202 until the stay order
issued by the Supreme Court in O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972), which barred the lower
court's interference, halted any further expansionist tendencies and left the intervention issue
undecided. Because O'Brien was being decided two days before the convention opened, the court
was reluctant to review the case on its merits in the absence of greater judicial precedent.
Later, in Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972),
certain Republican convention rules on the allocation of delegates through a bonus system were
held unconstitutional. But basing his decision on O'Brien, Mr. Justice Rehnquist issued a stay
order to preclude court review of party rules. Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Ripon Soc'y,
Inc., 409 U.S. 1222 (1972). An analysis of these proceedings can be found in 47 N.Y.U.L. REv.,
supra note 8, at 1224-27.
This matter has not yet been fully decided. Following the Republican convention, the
delegate allocation formula based on a bonus system was again challenged. In Ripon Soc'y, Inc.
v. National Republican Party, Nos. 74-1337 & 74-1358 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 1975), the D.C.
Circuit held that the Republican party 1976 formula did not violate the equal protection clause.
First amendment associational rights enabled the party to select a formula which rationally
advanced legitimate party interests in political effectiveness.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 reads in relevant part:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors . ...
.... The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes. ...
Note that participation by the public or by political parties is not guaranteed. See text accom-
panying note 8 supra for the relationship of this constitutional provision to political parties. See
note 12 infra for the relationship between this power and the state election laws covering delegate
selection.
11. E.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
12. Dicta in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), indicates that appointment of electors
may be made directly by the state legislatures without providing for an election by the voters. See
also, e.g., In re Green, 134 U.S. 377 (1890); Sanchez v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 239 (D.P.R.
1974); Gray v. State, 233 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Miss. 1964); Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692, 181
S.W.2d 269 (1944).
The Supreme Court has held that the primary is an integral part of the general election.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Since the primary election is the first step by state
law in a process designed to select a party's candidate for President, one might logically assume
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First amendment associational rights of political parties, however,
limit this broad power granted the states to regulate elections. 13 Be-
cause individuals have been extended "the right to band together for
the advancement of political beliefs,"' 4 a significant encroachment by
the state on their associational rights "cannot be justified upon a mere
showing of a legitimate state interest."'15 Yet the right to associate
politically is not absolute. 16 The Court's holding in Williams v.
Rhodes, 17 indicates that a "compelling state interest" might be dem-
onstrated to justify an abridgment by state election laws of the
political associational rights of individuals and their party. 18
that the article II, section 1 power would enable states to regulate the delegate selection process
within their state.
As the concurring opinion in Cousins indicates, regarding the process of selecting presidential
candidates, "[ulnder Art. I1, § 1, the States are given the power to 'appoint, in such manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct' Presidential electors." 95 S. Ct. at 551 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ.,
Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Within "our constitutional system, the States also have residual authority in all areas not'
taken from them by the Constitution or by validly enacted congressional legislation." Id. at 552
(Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J. concurring). Thus, as the Fifth Circuit in Riddell v.
National Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975), more recently noted, "the administra-
tion of the electoral process is a matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the states, [under]
Art. I, § 2, Art. II, § 1, in exercising their powers of supervision over elections . I... d at 776.
State regulations of elections are necessary to insure that elections are fair, honest and orderly.
[Tihe States have evolved comprehensive and in many respects complex election
codes regulating in most substantial ways, with regard to both federal and state
elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections .. and
the selection and qualifications of candidates.
Id. at 777, quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 731 (1974) (emphasis added).
13. Although political parties are afforded no specific protection in the Constitution, courts
have recognized that rights were established in the concept of freedom of association. U.S.
CONST. amend. I reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting ... the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This provision has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Inherent within this right of association is the right to
express one's attitudes by membership in a group. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs therefore was
logically extended to protect pressure groups, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and political groups as well, Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968).
For a more extensive treatment of political associational rights as they limit state power to
regulate elections see Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National
Political Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 148 (1970); 62 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1624-33.
14. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969).
15. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). But see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973).
16. E.g., Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma Personnel Bd., 338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972), affid, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (state
statute prohibiting political activities by state employees upheld). Also, in relation to the federal
government interference with associational rights, see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947).
17. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also 62 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1625-26 n.21.
18. The Ohio election laws involved in Williams had made it virtually impossible for a new
political party to be placed on the ballot in presidential elections. The Court noted that although
article II, section 1 of the Constitution granted extensive powers to the states to pass laws
regulating the selection of electors, this power was subject to limitations against burdening the
right to vote based upon the equal protection clause and the individual's first amendment
associational rights. The first amendment guarantee of the right to form a party would be
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Cousins v. Wigoda, however, significantly expands these associa-
tional rights of the party and its adherents. For the first time, the
Court recognized a constitutionally protected right of the party to be
free from state encroachment in setting qualifications for future dele-
gate selection at the national convention.' 9 In Cousins the Court
analyzed its former decisions which recognized a "right to associate
with the political party of one's choice ... 20 free from significant state
interference and decided that the circuit court injunction unconstitu-
tionally interfered with the ability of the Cousins delegates to partici-
pate in the convention. The Court further decided that the concept of
associational freedom also protects the party's right to determine its
own criteria for delegate selection. In so holding, the Court found that
the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify interfer-
ence with these associational rights. 2 1 The Court thus rejected respon-
dents' contention that the state's interest in protecting its citizens' right
to vote effectively and in maintaining the integrity of its electoral
meaningless if the state could keep the partv's candidates off the ballot. Even though the state
may have demonstrated some legitimate interests, it did not sustain its burden for showing a
compelling interest.
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Williams predicted that the decision might lead to a
wholesale revision by the courts of state ballot access provisions. 393 U.S. at 63 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting). Although some subsequent decisions did revise state regulations on ballot access, the
Court has not been consistent in the application of the compelling state interest test and has to
some extent retreated from this approach. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41, 91-101 (1974).
19. In the past, the Supreme Court had recognized the need for political parties to set
qualifications for candidates by requiring loyalty oaths. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). Yet
this decision was not based on any announced constitutional right of the party to assert its
political associational rights. Courts have also recognized the party's right to determine its own
membership. Yet these cases involved interpretation of state laws granting parties the right to
make these determinations; no constitutional right to determine membership was established. See
62 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1626 n.25. But see Bentman v. Seventh Ward Democratic
Executive Comm., 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d 261 (1966); Cook v. Houser, 122 Wisc. 534, 100 N.W.
964 (1904) (where the party's rights were limited).
Although it may have appeared that parties derived their power over delegate selection from
the first amendment, the existence of this right, and its scope, had not been established until the
Cousins v. Wigoda decision in which the Court expanded these rights to enable the party to
determine its own method of selecting delegates. Contrary to state law, delegates were seated who
had not been elected by Illinois voters.
Since the Cousins delegates were not elected under Illinois law, Mr. Justice Powell in his
dissenting opinion in Cousins argued that the state had "a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from being represented by delegates who have been rejected by these citizens in a
democratic election." 95 S. Ct. at 552 (Powell, J., dissenting).
After Cousins was decided, associational rights were further expanded to prevent the state
from granting one group the exclusive right to use the party name. Riddell v. National Demo-
cratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-58 (1973).
21. 95 S. Ct. at 548-49.
The Illinois Appellate Court had determined that the interference was justified since the state
had a legitimate interest to protect the effectiveness of the "votes cast at the primary from the
impairment that would result from stripping the respondents of their elected delegate status." Id.
at 548. See note 5 supra. But, as the Supreme Court noted, the state objective to have its elected
delegates seated may not have been accomplished even if the Cousins group has complied with
the injunction. The Party could not be forced to accept the Wigoda delegates and could have left
the seats vacant. All nine Justices agreed with this point.
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process 2 2 was paramount to the party's interest in establishing delegate
selection criteria. The Court said that "[c]onsideration of the special
function of delegates to such a Convention militates persuasively
against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitutes a compel-
ling state interest.
'2 3
In applying the compelling state interest test to associational
rights the Court appears to depart from its approach in Williams
regarding the state's broad article II, section 1 power to determine the
manner of appointing electors for President and Vice-President. 24 In
the instant case the Court does not elaborate on the state's power and
then apply limitations as it did in Willams. Rather, the Court suggests
that "[t]he States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in
the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates. "25
Yet, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, and Mr.
Justice Stewart note in their concurring opinion, the Court in the past
has recognized the state's authority to determine the manner of appoint-
ing presidential electors. 26 Notwithstanding its claim that this decision
does not reach the merits of the question, 27 it may be that the majority
holding that states have "no constitutionally mandated role" in the
selection process, merely indicates the Court's desire to preserve a
predominate role for Congress. The statement containing this holding
especially in view of its footnote,2 8 which refers to recent proposals in
22. The Court has traditionally held "that the right to vote is a 'fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights.' " 95 S. Ct. at 548.
One may question whether "the first amendment rights of one group [can] be enhanced at the
expense of those same rights in another group." Note, Mandates of the National Political Party
Clash with Interests of the Individual States as the Party Executes its Policy by Abolition of
State Delegate Selection Results: Legal Issues of the 1972 Democratic Convention and Beyond, 4
LOYOLA U. L.J. (CHi.) 137, 157 n.77 (1973). The convention disenfranchised those who voted for
the unseated delegates. But the majority in Cousins determined that the state's interest in
protecting voting rights in a primary must yield when no compelling interest has been dem-
onstrated.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 548. As the Court's reasoning in Cousins applied to delegate election for a
presidential nominating convention, it is questionable whether the decision will have a significant
impact on the state's role in congressional and state elections. State parties do not possess the
pervasive national interest of a national convention. States therefore may be able to demonstrate
more easily a compelling state interest superior to the ballot provisions. See, e.g., Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). But see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). Yet the expansion of
associational rights by Cousins could have some impact on congressional and state elections--
absent a compelling state interest.
24. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For a discussion of the implications of the
article II, section 1 power granted the states, see notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text. Of
course, like every other power in the Constitution, it is subject to constitutional limitations.
25. 95 S. Ct. at 549 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 551-52 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J., concurring). These Justices
argued that the question should not be whether the states have a "constitutionally mandated role"
in this process, but whether the state's 'authority was sufficient to justify this injunction which
"flatly prohibited" participation as delegates at the Convention. "[Tihe national convention, and
not the State, had the ultimate authority to choose among contesting delegations .... " Id. at
550.
27. Id. at 545-46 n.4.
28. Id. at 549 n.9.
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Congress to establish regional or national primaries for parties to
choose their nominees, might be interpreted to mean only that, al-
though states may possess the power to enact statutes regulating the
selection of presidential candidates, congressional power remains su-
preme. 
29
The concurring Justices also contend that the majority opinion, by
disclaiming any intent to rule on whether actions of national political
parties constitute state action, "intimate[d] views on questions on
which it disclaims any intimation of views, and . . . turn[ed] virtually
on its head the Court's opinion in O'Brien v. Brown .... -30 Whereas
in O'Brien, the Court stayed an intrusion by a lower federal court into
the internal processes of the party, in Cousins, the Court for the first
time ruled on the merits of a case involving associational rights of the
party exercised through its national convention. Although the practical
effect of Cousins was similar to that of O'Brien, as both cases nullified
lower court orders interfering with party affairs, a change in the
Court's viewpoint is evident in regard to its willingness to rule on the
constitutionality of enforcing party guidelines for delegate selection.
The Court's dicta in O'Brien indicated grave doubts concerning
whether courts should rule on the constitutionality of such guidelines.
But in Cousins the Court has receded from this position indicating,
again in dicta, that the question remains open whether the convention
or the courts are the proper forum to decide claims of unconstitutional-
ity of the party's delegate selection procedures.3 1 This admonition
should put political parties on notice that any outrageous guidelines
could be subjected to court scrutiny based on fourteenth amendment
and right-to-vote considerations.
32
Another issue raised by the concurring opinion is the "unnecessar-
ily broad and vague statement"33 the Court makes in claiming that
"the national convention 'serves the pervasive national interest in the
selection of candidates for national office, and that this interest is
greater than any interest of an individual State.' -134 The concurring
29. The Court has expressed divergent viewpoints in the past as to the power-sharing
relationship between the role of the federal government and state governments in regulating
elections. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The concurring Justices in Cousins, by
referring to Justice Stewart's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, indicated their opposition to granting
Congress power in this area of state domain.
30. 95 S. Ct. at 550 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J., concurring). The concurring
Justices contended that the majority in Cousins had virtually repudiated the Court's decision not
to intrude into party affairs in O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). See note 9 supra. It should
be noted, however, that since the stay order granted in O'Brien was based on the time factor, the
Court's views on the lack of wisdom by the court of appeals in interfering with party affairs was
merely dicta.
31. 95 S. Ct. at 549. The Wigoda delegates had not contested the constitutionality of the
Party's guidelines in Cousins.
32. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. 95 S. Ct. at 551.
34. Id. at 551 (Rehnquist & Stewart, JJ., Burger, C.J., concurring) quoting, 95 S. Ct. at 549
(emphasis added). The majority had argued that permitting states to adopt their own delegate
CASES NOTED
opinion attempts to narrow this holding as far as possible by noting
that the circuit court injunction was "as direct and severe an infringe-
ment of the right of association as can be conceived. '3 5 That is, the
circuit court's "flat prohibition" against participation would have pre-
vented the Cousins delegates from even asserting a claim for a conven-
tion seat.
Whether the concurring Justices would have ruled in favor of the
party and the Cousins group if the state interference had been less
severe remains unanswered. 3 6 But the omission of any suggestion of an
alternate method which the states could have employed to protect their
interests may indicate that an alternative was not readily available and
that any sanctions which a state might impose would significantly
inhibit the exercise of associational rights. Practically speaking, there-
fore, criticism of the overbreadth of the majority's statement should be
directed not at the extent of state infringement of the associational
rights, as the concurring opinion argues, but rather at the potential
expansion of the national convention's rights in selecting candidates
which will always prevail over any state rights.
37
qualifications would thwart public policy. As choosing candidates "involves coalitions cutting
across state lines," such state interference could impair the effectiveness of the national conven-
tion. Effective performance by the convention is of the utmost importance since, practically
speaking, candidates cannot succeed at "an election without a party nomination." Id. at 549.
35. Id. at 550.
36. The following court actions have been suggested as less severe remedies: 1) if the
injunction had been limited so as not to bar their appearance to assert a challenge; or 2) if the
lower court, in lieu of an injunction, had issued a declaratory judgment; or 3) if an order had
been issued pursuant to a state statute that state procedures be exhausted first before any
challenges can be made before the party.
As to the first of these alternatives, there seems to be little practical difference in preventing
individuals from appearing to assert their challenge as compared to preventing individuals from
participating if they are accepted by the party.
As to the second alternative, see O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in O'Brien that since declaratory relief is a "milder
remedy than an injunction," it would be particularly appropriate to "protect any constitutional
rights that may be threatened" and avoid a "premature issuance of an injunction" before the
convention had acted on the unseated delegates' claims. Yet the effects of a declaratory judgment
in this situation would be almost as inhibiting as an injunction.
Regarding a state's establishing procedures for challenging delegates to wage their contests
initially under state election laws, eight of the Justices would clearly reject this measure as being
a less direct infringement on associational rights. Only Mr. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion
was directed to the procedures outlined in the Illinois statute. The Cousins group had ignored this
system. 95 S. Ct. at 552 (Powell, J., dissenting). Only Justice Powell claimed that a state's
making available remedies would be a sufficient device to enable states to interfere with party
activities.
37. The concurring Justices also expressed views opposed to this incursion into the state
domain. See note 26 supra. However, these Justices, in addition, applied the Court's reasoning in
the cases dealing with state regulation of access to the ballot. See note 18 supra. For the
concurring Justices, the extent of the state's invasion of the associational right by the injunction
was decisive; they impliedly rejected the majority position that any significant invasion would
preclude state interference. The state may have several options available to it in regulating its
ballot. Yet an analogous situation does not exist when states interfere with the national delegate
selection process. Any interference would be significant. Therefore, the relevant question should
be whether the states can exercise their authority by demonstrating a compelling state interest.
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Furthermore, the majority's sweeping language, 38 which estab-
lishes the pervasive interest of the party over the state in the selection
of candidates, may be misleading to future courts. Subsequent deci-
sions could narrow the scope of this holding and distinguish Cousins as
applying only to state-party conflicts over open slate-making
guidelines-the delegate selection guideline mainly at issue in Cousins.
The possibility of making such distinctions has become extremely
significant in recent years because grounds for asserting challenges
have dramatically increased with the establishment by both major
parties of new guidelines for delegate selection. 39 That is, the rapidly
expanding number of delegate selection guidelines makes it necessary
for future courts to be more selective in determining which party rules
will prevail over conflicting state election laws. 40 Although the Cousins
Court did not deal with the issue, the scope of party guidelines should
also be scrutinized by the courts for the same reasons.
Certainty in this area of the law is essential to enable any future
challenging delegates to calculate the risk of sanctions being imposed if
seated at a convention in contravention of state law. The potential
sanctions are not insubstantial. For example, violation of an injunction
could lead to contempt proceedings, 41 as happened in Cousins. While
contempt proceedings for violating the injunction in this case were
only pending in the circuit court, that court was merely exercising its
discretion by waiting for this Supreme Court decision. An observer
might assume that the contempt proceedings would be dismissed as a
result of the Court's decision, 42 but the Cousins delegates did violate
an injunction, which is an act of disrespect for a court order. They
thus exposed themselves to the unresolved issue whether a contempt
38. It should be noted that the majority, later in its opinion, did somewhat limit its broad
statement, concerning the state interest in selecting candidates for national office, to a narrower
issue in this case. "Illinois' interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be
deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Conven-
tion." 95 S. Ct. at 549 (emphasis added). The implication is that states may have an interest in
other aspects of the nomination process. See, e.g., note 40 infra.
39. For an explanation of some of the revised Democratic Party guidelines see 62 GEO. L.J.,
supra note 8, at 1623 n.8, 1627; N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 8. For the Republican Party
see Miami Herald, March 7, 1975, § A, at 8, col. 2; N.Y. Times, March 6, 1975, at 42, col. 2.
40. Party guidelines on minority representation, winner-take-all primaries, and open slate-
making procedures would probably prevail over conflicting state election laws. Yet certain other
guidelines may not. See 62 GEO. L.J., supra note 8, at 1631-33. As the state's machinery is used
to conduct delegate selection procedures, a state could, for example, demonstrate an interest in
preventing abuse of its procedures through fraud.
41. For a definition and a detailed account of a court's contempt power-the expansion of its
use and the limitations imposed on its utilization-see R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER
(1963).
42. The Supreme Court made no determination on the contempt proceedings, most likely
because no contempt convictions were handed down. Some newpaper reports, however made the
assumption that the proceedings in this case would be dismissed. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at
16, col. 1; Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. For the contempt proceedings, see
note 4 supra. Possibly, the pending contempt proceedings prevented the Court from refusing to
reach the merits on the ground of mootness.
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conviction will stand even though the violated court order was uncon-
stitutional.
4 3
The conflicting court decisions in this area of law indicate the
possibility that the Cousins delegates and future challenging delegates
could be held in contempt for violating a court injunction. But impor-
tant first amendment associational rights were invaded by the Cousins
injunction. 44 Before contempt proceedings are brought against future
delegate challengers, the courts should consider these rights as mitigat-
ing circumstances. 45 As a precautionary measure, however, if an in-
junction is issued in the future to prevent delegates from participating
at conventions, the challenging delegates should at least apply for a
stay before violating the court order. The Cousins decision, in any
event, should enable individuals to assert challenges with greater
confidence than existed prior to the decision, and it provides a con-
stitutional basis for dissolving injunctions effectuating state law which
interferes with party convention affairs.
Cousins has also contributed to the erosion of a state political
party's power in the delegate selection process. The formulation of
rules at the national party level on delegate qualifications can now be
constitutionally enforced against non-complying state political parties.
As the national party is no longer hindered by state election laws,
conflicting state election laws can no longer be used by state parties to
justify their non-conformity to party rules. A more coherent national
political party philosophy can be established by unseating state delega-
tions in violation of party rules.
43. In certain cases, a criminal contempt conviction has been affirmed even though the
violated court order might have been unconstitutional. The most prominent recent case holding
violators of an unconstitutional injunction in contempt deal with civil rights march in Walker
v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Other federal courts punishing individuals for disobedience
of court orders are cited in Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 314-15 n.5. This holding was also
applied to a violation of an injunction inhibiting first amendment freedoms of newsmen. United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
Yet there has been some authority to the contrary. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); In re
McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); State ex rel. Superior Ct. v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d
608 (1971).
44. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), had indicated in dicta that attempts to
dissolve an injunction on constitutional grounds may prove a good defense to contempt. Applying
this reasoning, the Court could interpret the Cousins delegates' numerous court contests as
attempts to dissolve the injunction by preventing its issuance.
The circuit court at its discretion could certainly dismiss the charges, especially if it recog-
nizes that the Cousins delegates violated the injunction in good faith. Note that Alderman Singer,
one of the leaders of the Cousins group, claimed his group viewed Keane v. National Democratic
Party, 409 U.S. 1 (1972), as having already ruled that the courts lacked jurisdiction in this
matter. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1972, at 25, col. 1.
45. The importance of reversing any contempt convictions in this area cannot be stressed
enough. Political parties in the past had not enforced with vigor their few requirements on
delegate qualifications partly out of fear that any challenging delegates who are seated might be
answerable to their home state on contempt charges. Segal, Delegate Selection Standards: The
Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 873, 874 n.7 (1970). Furthermore, no
penalties can be exacted when individuals violate unconstitutional statutes. Injunctions, which
when issued clash with first amendment freedoms, deserve no greater status.
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Realizing that their procedures will be scrutinized according to
national party standards, state political parties should seek to comply
generally with the guidelines and work with the state legislatures to
amend delegate selection procedures. 4 6 States should recognize the
strong bargaining position provided the national party by the Cousins
decision. Party rules regarding delegate selection will prevail over state
laws even though the associational rights of the voters may have been
abridged when their elected delegates are denied seating. 47 Therefore,
it is within the state's interest to be represented at the convention by
those selected through the state's procedures. To prevent disenfran-
chisement resulting from the Cousins decision, states should enact ap-
propriate amendatory legislation. Conflicts between state law and
party rules could then be avoided, as well as numerous court chal-
lenges and costly litigation.
Democratic National Chairman, Robert S. Strauss, recognized that
this decision would place "ever greater responsibility on the political
parties ... to see that the expressed wishes and intent of the voters are
carried out."'48 Individuals who are still dissatisfied with party rules,
however, should not be precluded from access to the courts.
Courts also have a role in delegate selection procedures. The
Court has indicated in the Cousins dicta that party guidelines might be
subject to constitutional scrutiny to prevent an abridgment of indi-
vidual voter's equal protection and due process rights. 4 9 Numerous
commentators 50 would welcome such action by the courts to hold the
party accountable for its conduct.5' In selecting candidates for an
office as important as the Presidency, 52 party actions must be made
responsive to the will of the people.
Should the courts fail to scrutinize party rules, Congress may
take action in this area. Notwithstanding their claim that they are not
46. A practical problem may arise in the future, however, if the Democratic and Republican
parties should enact conflicting guidelines. Independent political parties, in addition, may also
adopt different rules. States may therefore be put in a position of enacting separate statutory
provisions, depending on the political party, on certain delegate selection procedures.
However, enacting legislation in broad terms so that delegates must meet the party require-
ments before they can represent the state may solve some of the problems with conflicting party
guidelines.
47. See note 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
48. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
49. For a good explanation of the need for judicial review see O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S.
1, 6-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The time factor which has precluded judicial review in the
past, such as in O'Brien, may not be an obstacle in the future in Democratic Party challenges
since DEMOCRATS ALL: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DELEGATE SELECTION AND PARTY
STRUCTURE (1973) now establishes that each state Democratic Party will submit by March 31,
1976, affirmative action plans on its proposed delegate selection procedures. 62 GEO. L.J., supra
note 8, at 1637-38.
50. See note 9 supra. But see 47 N.Y.L. REv., supra note 8, at 1185 n.5.
51. When inviting court review, the timing is important. If the convention disregards a
court order, or if a challenge arises after the convention, should courts be placed in the position to
void the actions of the whole convention?
52. See, e.g., E. CORWIN & L. KOENIG, THE PRESIDENCY TODAY (1956).
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deciding the point, the majority of the Cousins Court seem to indicate
that congressional action might be upheld to regulate party selection
criteria. 53 Yet, Congress must also realize that its statutory enactments
cannot invade the associational rights of the party. Although congres-
sional action is not now being advocated, the Court's continuous
refusal definitively to decide whether party activities may be subjected
to judicial intervention on constitutional grounds could necessitate a
congressional prescription of flexible standards to correct abuses in
delegate selection.
Uncertainty in this area of law can only inhibit individuals from
asserting their associational rights. Therefore, in any future cases
before the Supreme Court where state law has clashed with party rules,
the Court should define the scope of Cousins and clearly establish a
proper balance between state, party, and voter interests.
BRUCE A. HARRIS
ONE-YEAR DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE IS NOT VIOLATIVE
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellant Sosna's petition for dissolution of marriage was dis-
missed by a state trial court for lack of jurisdiction due to a failure to
comply with Iowa's durational residency requirement,1 which requires
that a petitioner in a dissolution of marriage action be an Iowa resident
for one year preceding the filing of the petition if the respondent is a
non-resident. 2 Subsequently, pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, appellant brought a class action against the state of
Iowa and the trial court judge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa,
asserting that Iowa's durational residency requirement violated the
United States Constitution on equal protection and due process
grounds. After certifying that the appellant represented the class of
persons who had resided in Iowa for less than one year, and who
desired to initiate dissolution of marriage actions, 3 the three-judge
district court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.4 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court5 held, affirmed: The Iowa one-year
53. But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (where the Justices were widely split on
the issue of congressional intervention into state election qualifications).
1. IOWA CODE § 598.6 (1971).
2. Appellant-wife moved to Iowa in August 1972 and filed her petition for dissolution of
marriage in September 1972. Respondent-husband was a resident of New York at the time of
filing.
3. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
4. Id.
5. Before the Court dealt with the substantive issues of Sosna, it first addressed itself to the
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